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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XI AUTUMN-WINTER 1961 Number 1
MORTGAGES-PROBLEMS IN POSSESSION,
RENTS, AND MORTGAGEE LIABILITY
ROBERT KRATOVIL
HE HISTORY of mortgage law is the history of hundreds of years
of ceaseless struggle for advantage between borrowers and
lenders, and the lawbooks reflect the constantly shifting for-
tunes of this war. Occasionally the battle has gone in favor of the
lenders. More recently the battle has usually gone in favor of the bor-
rowers, and many laws favorable to the borrowers have been passed.
To understand how the modem mortgage developed out of these
centuries of struggle is to take a long step forward toward under-
standing modem mortgage law.
Much of our mortgage law comes to us from England. In that
country, mortgage arrangements of various kinds existed even in the
Anglo-Saxon times before the conquest of England by William the
Conqueror in 1066 A.D. However, it will suffice for our purposes to
begin with the mortgage of the 14th century. This document was a
simple deed of the land, running from the borrower, (mortgagor) to
the lender (mortgagee). All the ceremonies needed for a full transfer
of ownership took place when the mortgage was made. The mort-
gagee became the owner of the land, just as if a sale had taken place.
However, this ownership was subject to two qualifications:
1. The mortgagee, as owner, could and often did oust the mort-
gagor and take immediate possession of the property and collect the
rents. However, it was necessary that the rents so collected be ap-
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plied on the mortgage debt. For this reason, the mortgagee often per-
mitted the mortgagor to remain in possession.
2. The mortgage described the debt it secured and stated a date of
payment known as the law day. The mortgage gave the mortgagor
the right to pay the debt on the law day. If he did so, the mortgage
provided that it was thereby to become void. This provision was
known as the defeasance clause, for payment of the debt on the law
day defeated the mortgage and put ownership back in the mortgagor.
In early times, the courts enforced the mortgage as it was written.
Foreclosure proceedings were not necessary and did not even exist.
Failure to pay the mortgage debt when due, termed a default, extin-
guished all the mortgagor's interest in the land.
For many years no one dreamed of questioning this scheme of
things. Then, slowly at first, and later in greater numbers, borrowers
who had lost their property through default began to seek the assist-
ance of the king. A typical petition addressed to the king by such a
borrower would set forth the borrowing of the money, the making of
the mortgage, the default in payment, and the resulting loss of the
land. The petition would continue with the statement that the bor-
rower now had funds and offered to pay the mortgage debt in full,
with interest. The petition would then ask or pray that the king order
the mortgagee, who now owned the land, to accept the proffered
money and to convey the land back to the borrower. The king had
little time or inclination to tend to these petitions personally, and so
he habitually referred them to a high official, the Lord Chancellor.
Since the king was the fountain of all justice, it was the Chancellor's
duty to dispose of these petitions justly and equitably, according to
good conscience, and this he did. In cases of hardship or accident, for
example, where the mortgagor had been robbed while on his way to
pay the debt, the Chancellor would order the mortgagee to accept
payment of the debt from the borrower and to convey the land back
to the borrower. A mortgagee who refused to do as he was told was
sent to jail. In time, by about the year 1625, what had begun as a
matter of grace on the part of the king had developed into the purest
routine. Borrowers filed their petitions directly with the Chancellor,
who was now functioning as the judge of a court, instead of with the
king, and with routine regularity his order issued, commanding the
mortgagee to convey. Thus a new and very important right was born,
the right of the mortgagor to pay his debt even after default, and in
this manner to recover his property. This right came to be known as
POSSESSION, RENTS, AND MORTGAGEE LIABILITY
the equitable right of redemption, or the equity of redemption. Later
the courts held that the mortgagor could sell this equitable right of
redemption; that he could dispose of it by his will; and that if he died
leaving no will, the right could be exercised by his heirs. As a result
of these developments, the mortgagor, even after default, retained
very important rights in the land. Technically the mortgagee became
full owner of the land upon default, but practically the mortgagor
could now be regarded as the owner even after default, since he could
re-acquire ownership by making redemption.
The mortgagees reacted to the development of the equitable right
of redemption by inserting in their mortgages clauses reciting that the
mortgagor waived and surrendered all his equitable rights of redemp-
tion. The courts, however, nipped this idea in the bud by holding that
al such clauses were void, since a necessitous borrower will sign any-
thing, and it is up to the courts to protect him. This rule thrived and
flourished and exists in full vigor today. Any provision in the mort-
gage purporting to terminate the mortgagor's ownership in case of
his failure to make his payments when due is against public policy and
is absolutely void. "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage." It cannot
be converted into an outright deed by the mere default of the mort-
gagor. And no matter how the mortgagee seeks to disguise an at-
tempted waiver of the equitable right of redemption, the courts will
strike it down. For example, in one case, at the time the mortgage was
made, the mortgagor signed a deed conveying the property to the
mortgagee as grantee, and delivered the deed to a third person in
escrow with directions to deliver the deed to the mortgagee in case
of default in the mortgage payments. This deed and escrow were held
invalid, as an attempted waiver of the equitable right of redemption.'
The efforts of the courts to rescue the mortgagor in turn placed the
mortgagee at a disadvantage. The mortgagee, it is true, became the
owner of the land when the mortgagor defaulted, but he could not be
certain he would remain the owner, for the mortgagor might choose
to redeem. To remedy this situation, a new practice sprang up. Imme-
diately upon default in payment of the mortgage debt the mortgagee
would file a petition in court, and the judge would enter an order,
called a decree, allowing the mortgagor additional time to pay the
debt. If he failed to pay within this time, usually six months or a year,
'Plummer v. Use, 41 Wash. 5, 82 Pac. 1009 (1905). Accord, Hamud v. Hawthorne,
52 Cal.2d 78, 338 P.2d 387 (1959).
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the decree provided that his equitable right of redemption was there-
by barred and foreclosed. Thereafter he could not redeem his prop-
erty. Thus developed the foreclosure suit, a suit to bar or terminate
the equitable right of redemption. 2
The method of foreclosure just described is known today as strict
foreclosure. It is still used in Connecticut and Vermont. The decree
of foreclosure does not order a sale of the premises, but merely al-
lows the mortgagor a specified period to make redemption, that is, to
pay the mortgage debt, and further provides that if redemption is not
made within such period, the mortgagor and all persons claiming un-
der him shall be barred and foreclosed of all their right and equity of
redemption. At the expiration of the time allowed for redemption,
the mortgagee becomes the full owner of the property, if redemption
has not been made.
The next development was foreclosure through public sale. The
idea emerged that in mortgage foreclosures, justice would best be
served by offering the land for sale at public auction, for if at such
sale the property sold for more than the mortgage debt, the mort-
gagee would be paid his debt in full and the surplus funds would be
salvaged for the mortgagor. This method of foreclosure by sale is
the most common method of foreclosure in America today. This de-
velopment constituted another major victory for the mortgagor.
More important still, it led to another and even greater victory for the
borrowers. As the practice of foreclosure by sale grew more com-
mon, the view began to emerge that the mortgage, despite its super-
ficial similarity to a deed, was really not a deed of conveyance but
only a lien on the land-that is, merely a means of bringing about a
sale to raise money for the payment of the mortgage debt.
The relatively recent view, that the mortgage is not really a con-
veyance of land but only a lien, has reached its fullest development in
the agricultural and western states although some eastern states fol-
low this view. These states are called lien theory states. Certain states,
called title theory states, still take the older view that a mortgage gives
the mortgagee some sort of legal title to the land. Some states take a
position midway between these two views. These are called inter-
mediate states.
The difference in viewpoint between title theory and lien theory
states is of greatest importance with respect to the mortgagee's right
2 KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 229 (3rd ed. 1958).
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to the possession and rents of the mortgaged property. To illustrate
the significance of this statement let us list, in chronological order,
some important dates in a mortgage situation: (1) The date the mort-
gage is signed by the mortgagor. (2) The date when the mortgagor
first defaults. (3) The date when the mortgagee files his foreclosure
suit. (4) The date of the foreclosure sale. (5) The date when the
statutory redemption period (hereinafter discussed) expires and the
mortgagee or other purchaser at the foreclosure sale receives the deed
under which he becomes the owner of the mortgaged property.
Let us first make our broad generalizations and thereafter list the
particular points of difference that exist. In general, the title states re-
gard the mortgage as retaining some of its early character, that is,
they view it as a sort of conveyance of the land, so that immediately
on the signing of the mortgage, the mortgagee has the right to take
possession of the property and collect the rents thereof. On the other
hand, the lien states regard the mortgage as merely creating the right
to acquire the land through foreclosure of the mortgage, so that the
mortgagor remains the full owner of the land with the right to pos-
session and rents until the statutory redemption period has expired
and the foreclosure deed has issued. In other words, at its most ex-
treme, this difference in point of view represents to the mortgagee
the difference between dates one and five in the list, so far as the right
to possession and rents is concerned. In title states, therefore, rents
are an important part of the mortgagee's security. In lien states, rents
are not part of the mortgagee's security.Y Now let us analyze the
situation in somewhat greater detail, from the point of view just ex-
pressed:
1. In a number of title theory states (Alabama, Maryland and
Tennessee, for example) the mortgagee immediately upon execution
of the mortgage has the right to take possession and collect the rents
of the mortgaged property.4 This right exists even though the mort-
gage is silent on this point. There are two exceptions: (1) In recent
times laws have been passed in some tide states giving the mortgagor
the right of possession until default occurs. In effect, these laws con-
vert such states into intermediate states. (2) Many mortgage forms
3 Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 213 N.W. 304 (1927).
4 Darling Shop v. Nelson Realty Co., 262 Ala. 495, 79 So.2d 793 (1955); Wethered v.
Alban Tractor Co., 224 Md. 408, 168 A.2d 358 (1961); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§ 3.59 (Casner ed. 1952).
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used in title states give the mortgagor the right of possession until
default.
2. In intermediate states (Illinois, North Carolina, New Jersey and
Ohio, for example) the mortgagor has the right of possession until his
first default, but after default the mortgagee has the right to take
possession. In other respects these states follow title theory.
3. In lien theory states, in the absence of a provision in the mort-
gage to the contrary, the mortgagor is entitled to possession and rents
at least until the foreclosure sale.
4. In some lien states the mortgagor may, either by express provi-
sion in the mortgage or by a separate assignment of rents signed at the
time the mortgage is signed, give the mortgagee the right to take pos-
session and collect rents as soon as a default occurs, and such provi-
sions are valid.5
5. In other lien states provisions such as those described in para-
graph four above are considered void as against public policy.6
6. In all states, if the mortgagor, after defaulting in his mortgage
payments, voluntarily turns over possession to the mortgagee, the
mortgagee has the legal right to remain in possession. Notice that in
paragraph five it is the clause in the mortgage binding the mortgagor
to give up possession at some future time when default occurs that is
held void. The same agreement made after default is valid. The mort-
gagee is then called a mortgagee in possession.
7. Whenever a mortgagee takes possession before he has acquired
ownership of the property by foreclosure, the rents he collects must
be applied in reduction of the mortgage debt. A mortgagee does not
become the owner of the property by taking possession. Foreclosure
is necessary today in all states for the mortgagee to acquire owner-
ship of the land.
8. Whenever a mortgagee has the right to possession, if he fails to
exercise that right and allows the mortgagor to remain in possession
collecting rents, it is the universal rule that the rents so collected be-
long to the mortgagor.
5 Dick & Reuteman Co. v. Jem Realty Co., 225 Wis. 428, 274 N.W. 416 (1937); Penn
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Katz, 139 Neb. 501, 297 N.W. 899 (1941); Hulseman v. Dirks
Land Co., 63 S.D. 404, 259 N.W. 679 (1935); Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating
Corp., 18 Cal.2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941).
6 State ex rel. Gwinn v. Superior Court, 170 Wash. 463, 16 P.2d 831 (1932); Rives v.
Mincks Hotel Co., 167 Okla. 500, 30 P.2d 911 (1934); Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v.
Canby Inv. Co., 190 Minn. 144, 251 N.W. 129 (1933); Hart v. Bingman, 171 Okla. 429,
43 P.2d 447 (1935).
POSSESSION, RENTS, AND MORTGAGEE LIABILITY
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM
A mortgage lender seeks a regular return on a safe investment and
does not wish to assume the responsibilities of management. A lender
is most unlikely to make a loan that will require him to go into im-
mediate possession of the land, and this right is therefore seldom ex-
ercised. On the mortgagor's default, however, it is imperative that
prompt action be taken to seize the rents so that they will not be di-
verted to the mortgagor's own personal use. An eviction suit to en-
force the mortgagee's right to possession is often a long, drawn out
affair, especially when the mortgagor is interposing all the legal ob-
stacles available to him. However, if the mortgagee files a foreclosure
suit, he can often have a receiver appointed in a matter of days, and
this is the course usually preferred. It has other advantages. A mort-
gagee in possession must credit on the mortgage debt not only all the
net rents received, but also all rents that he might have received by
the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Example: A mortgagee took possession after default and ousted the
mortgagor's tenant, who was paying thirty-five dollars per month
rent. The mortgagee claimed at the time that he had been offered one
hundred dollars per month rent. However, the mortgagee himself oc-
cupied the premises. The court held that the mortgagee must credit
one hundred dollars per month on the mortgage debt.7
A receiver's leases are approved by the court, and he assumes no
such responsibility. Again, as will hereafter appear, entry by the
mortgagee may automatically terminate leases executed by the mort-
gagor, and if these leases are favorable to the landlord, such a course
is to be avoided, if possible. Appointment of a receiver will ordinarily
not have such a result.8 Also, though there is some question, as has
been pointed out, as to the right of a mortgagee to retain possession
during the redemption period, courts will often allow a receiver to
collect the rents during this period, if the foreclosure sale is for less
than the mortgage debt.9
However, the mortgagee's right to possession is of value to the
mortgagee in overthrowing prepaid leases and other devices em-
ployed by a mortgagor who is on the brink of default, which is dis-
7 Merrion v. O'Donnell, 302 IlM. App. 467, 24 N.E.2d 264 (1939).
8 First Nat'l Bank v. Gordon, 287 IMI. App. 83,4 N.E.2d 504 (1936).
9 Haas v. Chicago Bldg. Soc., 89 1. 498 (1878).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
cussed more fully hereafter. Also, when the mortgagee forecloses,
but because of some defect in the foreclosure he fails to acquire good
title, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, who is usually the mort-
gagee, on obtaining his deed and taking possession, is regarded as a
mortgagee in possession. He has the right to retain this possession un-
til the mortgage debt is paid, even though the debt has, in the mean-
time, become outlawed by lapse of time, so that it would be impossi-
ble for the mortgagee to file a new foreclosure suit.'
Appointment of a receiver has distinct advantages in many lien
states. In most lien states, even though the receiver has been appointed
only to preserve the property from destruction, the courts will apply
in reduction of the mortgage debt the rents collected by the receiver,
despite the absence of an assignment of rents," a truly astounding re-
sult. However, in other lien states the courts will not allow the re-
ceiver to apply rents to payment of the mortgage. 12
Where the mortgaged property is occupied by the mortgagor as
his home, courts are reluctant to order him to pay rent to a receiver,
especially in lien states. 13
Courts differ as to the grounds for appointment of a receiver. Some
say it is enough that the property is inadequate security for the mort-
gage debt. Other courts require a showing that the security is inade-
quate and that the mortgagor is insolvent. Still others appoint a re-
ceiver only when the property is in danger of destruction. 14
LEASES PRIOR TO MORTGAGE
A lease that antedates a mortgage, if duly recorded, is prior and su-
perior to the mortgage. In most states this would also be the case even
if the lease were not recorded, for normally the lessee is in possession
and in most states possession gives all the world notice of the tenant's
rights. With respect to these prior leases the following points should
be kept in mind:
1. Such a lease, since it is prior and superior to the mortgage, can-
not be extinguished by foreclosure of the mortgage.
10 Stouffer v. Harlan, 68 Kan. 135, 74 Pac. 610 (1903); Pettit v. Louis, 88 Neb. 496, 129
N.W. 1005 (1911).
11 Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 215 N.W. 571 (1927).
12 Windom Nat'l Bank v. Reno, 172 Minn. 193, 214 N.W. 886 (1927); Desiderio v.
ladonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 163 Atl. 254 (1932).
13 Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 263 N.Y. 148, 188 N.E. 285 (1933); Contra, Peritz v. Taub,
279 I1. App. 264 (1935).
14 26 A.L.R. 33 (1923).
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2. If such a lease contains an option to purchase the property, the
option must be subordinated to the mortgage. Otherwise there is
danger that exercise of the option would extinguish the mortgage.
3. Complete subordination of a prior lease to a subsequent mort-
gage is legally possible. A subordination agreement signed by the
lessee makes his lease junior to the mortgage, subject to extinguish-
ment by foreclosure of the mortgage, just as if the lease had been
signed after the recording of the mortgage. Oddly enough subordina-
tion of the lease to the mortgage in some respects weakens the mort-
gagee's position, as is evident from the subsequent discussion.
4. In title and intermediate states, on default in the mortgage pay-
ments, the mortgagee has the right to serve a demand on a senior les-
see (one whose lease antedates the mortgage) and the lessee must
thereafter pay rent to the mortgagee. The lessee has no right to move
out, as is true of junior lessees, as hereinafter explained. This rule
stems from the notion in title and intermediate states that the mort-
gage is a transfer of some sort of title to the morgagee, a notion pre-
viously referred to herein. Because of this mysterious transfer of title,
there is created between the lessee and the subsequent mortgagee an
equally mysterious link called "privity of estate." It is this privity of
estate that makes the lessee liable to a subsequent mortgagee for
rents. 15 While it has its benefits, this rule also carries some burdens as
we shall subsequently see. This rule, it is evident, has one unusual
consequence, namely, it helps the mortgagee collect rent where his
mortgage is junior to the lease. Naturally, the tenant has no obligation
to pay rent to such mortgagee until the mortgagee serves a demand on
the tenant to pay such rent.16
In lien theory states, the mortgagee ordinarily is not entitled to
make such a demand on the tenant. 17 This follows from the fact that
in these states a mortgage conveys no title; hence privity of estate is
lacking.
LEASES JUNIOR TO THE MORTGAGE
With respect to leases that are junior to the mortgage (e.g., leases
made by the mortgagor after the recording of the mortgage) the
following rules are applicable:
15 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 347 (1951); 55 L.R.A. (n.s.) 190, 200 (1915).
16 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 347 (1951).
17 55 L.R.A. (n.s.) 190, 200 (1915).
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1. Such a lease can be extinguished by foreclosure of the mortgage.
2. Occasionally a mortgagee will wish to foreclose his mortgage
without extinguishing the lease. In some states this is possible and in
others not.' 8 In states where it is legally impossible to preserve a jun-
ior lease when a mortgage is foreclosed, a mortgagee must be wary of
placing reliance on such leases.
3. In title and intermediate states the mortgagor has the right to
evict junior leases as soon as default occurs in the mortgage pay-
ments. This is also true in lien states where a clause is inserted in the
mortgage giving the mortgagee the right to possession on default and
the state is one that recognizes the validity of such a provision. Al-
ternatively the mortgagee may serve a demand which gives the ten-
ant a choice as between moving out or paying rent to the mortgagee.
However, the mortgagee cannot compel the tenant to remain and pay
rent to him. This is so because where the lease is subsequent to the
mortgage, there is no privity of estate between the mortgagee and the
lessee.' 9 For this reason, it is better for the mortgagee to proceed in
such a situation under the assignment of rents, for then the tenant
must stay and pay rent to the mortgagee.2 0
4. If the mortgagee enters under his mortgage, as stated in para-
graph three, and the tenant chooses to remain and pay rent, in many
states the result is to terminate the lease and create a month-to-month
or year-to-year tenancy.21 Here again if the mortgagee wishes to pre-
serve the leases it is best for him to proceed under his assignment of
rents rather than under the mortgage.
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
At the time the mortgage is signed, the mortgagee should require
the mortgagor to sign a separate assignment of leases and rents. This
document assigns to the mortgagee all existing leases, all leases to be
executed in the future, and all rents falling due after the date of the
mortgage, all as additional security for payment of the mortgage
debt. Lawyers have found that there is magic in the argument that
the mortgage creates a lien on the land, and that the assignment cre-
ates a lien on the rents.2 2 All existing tenants are notified of the mak-
18 109 A.L.R. 455 (1937).
19 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 350 (1951).
20 Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Wagreen Co., 272 Il1. App. 434 (1933).
21 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 352 (1951).
22 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 371-72 (1951).
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ing of the assignment. The assignment is recorded. The following
rules are applicable:
1. In most lien states an assignment of rents enables the mortgagee
to reach the rents accruing prior to foreclosure sale and treat them as
part of the security for his debt. This gives the mortgagee in a lien
state virtually as favorable a position with regard to rents as the mort-
gagee has in title and intermediate states. In one or two lien states an
assignment of rents, like the mortgage clause giving the right to take
possession on default, is held invalid as being opposed to public pol-
icy.23 Also in a few lien states an assignment signed contemporane-
ously with the mortgage is given only limited recognition. In these
states after a default occurs, and after the assignment has been acti-
vated as hereinafter discussed, rents collected by the mortgagee can be
applied only to maintain the property or to pay taxes or insurance.
They cannot be applied in reduction of the mortgage debt.24
2. Since the assignment does not contemplate that the mortgagee
will begin collecting rents immediately upon the signing of the as-
signment, but only after a default occurs, the assignment is inopera-
tive until it is "activated" by some action of the mortgagee.25 Rents
collected by the mortgagor before the assignment is activated belong
to the mortgagor,26 or they may become the property of a junior
mortgagee who exercises greater diligence. If A holds a first mort-
gage and B holds a second mortgage on the same property, default
occurs, and B activates his assignment but A does not, B gets the
rents.2 7 Even specific language that the assignment will operate auto-
matically on default has been held insufficient to activate the assign-
ment.2s There are a number of cases which contain the statement
that an assignment can be drafted to operate automatically, and one
or two cases appear to so hold.29 A number of cases stating this rule
are cited in Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp.,30 but as you
23 Hart v. Bingman, 171 Okla. 429,43 P.2d 447 (1935).
24 Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Canby, 190 Minn. 144, 251 N.W. 129 (1933); West-
ern Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Mufflin,162 Wash. 33, 297 Pac. 743 (1931).
25 Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942); In re
Clark Realty Co., 234 Fed. 576 (1916).
26 Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N.Y. 217, 119 N.E. 405 (1918); Note, The Mortgagee's Right
to Rents After Default, 50 YALE L.J. 1424 (1941).
27 Stevens v. Blue, 388 Ill. 92, 57 N.E. 2d 451 (1944).
2 8 Dime Say. Bank of Brooklyn v. Lubart, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 252 (1942).
29 New Jersey Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolf, 108 N.J. Eq. 412, 155 Ad. 372 (1931).
30 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941).
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read these cases almost invariably there is some circumstance present
which reveals some demand, suit for rent, voluntary payment of rent
by mortgagor or other action taken by the mortgagee to activate the
assignment. It must be deemed unsafe, as a business proposition, to
rely on any automatic operation of the assignment. Michigan has a
statute which may create a special situation in that state.8
3. Everywhere the assignment is properly activated if the mort-
gagor consents to collection of the rent after default and pursuant to
the assignment, and the tenants begin paying rent to the mortgagee. 2
4. In title and intermediate states the assignment is activated on de-
fault by the mortgagee's serving notice on the tenants to pay rent to
the mortgagee. The mortgagor's consent is unnecessary.83
5. In some lien states the assignment can be activated in the same
manner as in title states.84
6. In other lien states the assignment can be activated only by the
mortgagee's filing a foreclosure suit and applying for the appoint-
ment of a receiver.85 Of course these same steps will serve to activate
an assignment in a title or intermediate state.86
7. In one or two lien states an assignment can only be activated by
the mortgagor voluntarily turning over possession to the mortgagee
or allowing the mortgagee to collect rents.8 7
8. Rents collected by the mortgagee under an activated assignment
must be applied to taxes, repairs, insurance and, in most states, the
mortgage debt.
9. Whenever a mortgagee acts under an activated assignment, he
does not destroy existing leases, as sometimes occurs when a mort-
gagee takes possession under his mortgage. An assignment preserves
valuable leases.
10. A mortgagee acting under an assignment is accountable to the
mortgagor only for rents actually collected.
81 Security Trust Co. v. Sloman, 252 Mich. 266, 233 N.W. 216 (1930); Smith v. Mutual
Ben. Life Ins. Co., 362 Mich. 114, 106 N.W. 2d 515 (1960).
8250 Yale L.J. 1424 (1941), supra note 26.
88 Randal v. Jersey Mortgage iv. Co., 306 Pa. 1, 158 At. 865 (1932); Grannis-Blair
Audit Co. v. Maddux, 167 Tenn. 297, 69 S.W. 2d 238 (1934); 2 JONES, MORTGAGES 366
(8th ed. 1928).
84 Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941); Long
Island Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Brown, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (1939).
85 Dick & Reuteman Co. v. Jem Realty Co., 225 Wis. 428, 274 N.W. 416 (1937); Hall
v. Goldsworthy, 136 Kan. 247, 14 P.2d 659 (1932).
86 Fleischer v. Flick, 334 Ill. App. 461, 80 N.E. 2d 81 (1948).
87 Hart v. Bingman, 171 Okla. 429,43 P.2d 447 (1935).
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11. When a mortgagee who holds an assignment of rents sells and
assigns his mortgage, he should also assign the assignment of rents to
the assignee of the mortgage.38
RENT REDUCTIONS, LEASE CANCELLATIONS AND
ADVANCE PAYMENTS OF RENT
A problem of considerable importance is the extent to which a re-
ceiver or a mortgagee entering into possession is bound by rent re-
ductions, prepayments of rents, and lease cancellations effected by
the mortgagor for a cash consideration. Such agreements are stand-
ard devices by which hard-pressed mortgagors pocket the future
earning capacity of the land and deliver to the mortgagee the empty
shell of the mortgaged asset. Again, differences exist between title
theory and lien theory states. The following are some of the applica-
ble rules:
1. In title and intermediate theory states, when the lease is made
subsequently to the mortgage, the mortgagee is not bound by any
advance rent payments made by the tenant to the mortgagor, and on
appointment of a receiver or on the mortgagee's taking possession of
the land, the tenant will nevertheless have to pay rent thereafter to
such receiver or mortgagee, even though he has already paid his rent
in advance to the mortgagor. 9 This rule follows from the rule that
recording of the mortgage gives all the world, including subsequent
tenants, notice of the mortgagee's rights, and these rights include the
right to take possession on default. This rule is of special importance
to a tenant who pays a large sum of money for the privilege of re-
ceiving a lease, for example, a tenant in a co-operative apartment; a
tenant of commercial space who pays a large "bonus" for receiving
his lease; or any tenant who plans to make substantial investments in
alterations in reliance on his lease.
2. In title and intermediate states, if the lease antedates the mort-
gage, recording of the mortgage does not give the tenant notice of
the mortgagee's rights, for recording of the mortgage gives notice
only to those persons who acquire rights in the property after re-
cording of the document. The question therefore arises, if the ten-
ant, acting in good faith and in ignorance of the mortgage, prepays
his rent to the mortgagor, and the mortgagor thereafter defaults, is
88 Koury v. Sood, 74 R.I. 486,62 A. 2d 649 (1948).
89 Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 111. 450, 168 N.E. 266 (1929).
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this prepayment binding on the mortgagee, or must the tenant pay
his rent again to the mortgagee? Some cases hold for the mortgagee
and some hold for the tenant.40 The mortgagee can protect himself
by procuring, at the time the mortgage is signed, an assignment of all
existing leases, and by giving tenants notice at that time of his rights
under such assignment.
3. In many lien theory states, the mortgagee is bound by advance
payments of rents made in good faith by the tenant to the mortgagor,
and when the mortgagee's receiver takes possession he will find him-
self unable to collect any rents from the tenant.41
4. But even in lien theory states following the rule stated in the
last preceding paragraph, if the mortgagee, at the time the mortgage
is made, obtains from the mortgagor an assignment of rents and leases
and notifies the tenants thereof as suggested in the discussion of rent
assignments, the mortgagee will not be bound by any advance pay-
ments of rent made by the tenant to the mortgagor.4 2 Also no rent
reduction granted by the mortgagor after the tenant has notice of this
assignment will be effective.
4 8
5. Where the mortgagor, at the time of making the mortgage, by
a separate instrument, assigns an existing lease to the mortgagee, and
the lessee is notified of the assignment, the tenant and mortgagor
thereafter cannot cancel the lease, or reduce the rent, so far as the
mortgagee is concerned. On the mortgagee's taking possession, or on
the appointment of a receiver, the tenant can be held to his lease.4
If there is no assignment of rents, and the lease is prior to the mort-
gage, a cancellation of the lease made by the mortgagor and lessee
may be valid.4
40 ANNOT., 1916 D ANN. CAs. 200; 55 L.R.A. (n.s.) 233 (1915); 2 JONES, MORTGAGES
362 (8th ed. 1928).
41 Smith v. Cushatt, 199 Ia. 690, 202 N.W. 548 (1925); Ottman v. Tilbury, 204 Wis. 56,
234 N.W. 325 (1931); Isaacs v. Greenberg, 145 N.Y.S. 921 (1914); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. 75 Prospect Co-op Apt., 131 N.J. Eq. 387, 25 A. 2d 508 (1931).
42 Cloter Realty Inc. v. Primer Realty Corp., 27 N.Y.S. 2d 850 (1941); Bank of Man-
hattan Trust Co. v. 571 Park Ave. Corp., 263 N.Y. 57, 188 N.E. 156 (1933); Franzen v.
G. R. Kinney Co., 218 Wis. 53,259 N.W. 850 (1935).
43 Franzen v. G. R. Kinney Co., 218 Wis. 53, 259 N.W. 850 (1935).
44 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. W. T. Grant Co., 321 Ill. App. 487, 53 N.E. 2d 255
(1944); Mercantile & Theaters Properties v. Stanley Co., 346 Pa. 343, 30 A. 2d 136
(1943); Franzen v. G. R. Kinney Co., 218 Wis. 53, 259 N.W. 850 (1935); Darling Shop
v. Nelson Realty Co., 262 Ala. 495, 79 So. 2d 793 (1955).
45 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. W. T. Grant Co., 321 Ill. App. 487, 53 N.E. 2d 255
(1944).
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With respect to the language of the assignment, some suggestions
might be pertinent:
1. It should be a document separate from the mortgage. It should
assign the mortgagor's interest in all existing leases and the interest
of the mortgagor, or his assignee, in leases that may be executed in
the future by the mortgagor, or his assignees. Leases of any impor-
tance should be specifically set forth in the assignment.
2. It might be helpful not to state that the assignment will only be-
come operative on default, but instead make the assignment a pres-
ently operative assignment, giving the mortgagor the privilege of col-
lecting and keeping rent until default. Include a clause reading as
follows:
Notwithstanding that this instrument is a present assignment of said rents
it is understood and agreed that the undersigned may collect the same and
manage said real estate and improvements the same as if this assignment has
not been given, if and so long as only the undersigned shall not be in any
default whatever with respect to the payments of principal and/or interest
due on said loan, or in the performance of any other obligation on our part
to be performed thereunder.
3. The mortgage should refer to the assignment of rents and the
assignment of rents should refer to the mortgage, so that the mort-
gagee can resort to one or the other as convenience dictates, and
should permit entry under mortgage as to part of the premises and
under assignment as to other parts of the premises.
Example: As to one store in the building a lease junior to the mort-
gage is so unfavorable that it should be terminated and the tenant
ousted. Enter under the mortgage.
Example: As to another store a lease junior to the mortgage is very
favorable. Enter under the assignment.
4. The right to cancel or alter existing leases should be included.
5. The assignment should include the right to the use and posses-
sion of furniture, appliances, etc. While such a provision will be help-
ful, neither a rent assignment nor the appointment of a receiver is a
substitute for a chattel mortgage. In other words, if there is valuable
personal property on the mortgaged premises (e.g., a hotel) the mort-
gagee may not have the legal right to the possession of such personal
property unless he has a chattel 'Mortgage.4"
6. The assignment should include the right to operate the business
(hotels, etc.) and to take possession of books and records.
4644 YALEL. J. 701 (1935).
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7. The assignment should confer the right to apply rents to the
payments on furniture bought on credit, to insurance premiums on
personal property, etc.
8. The assignee should be given the right to apply rents to the
mortgage debt. Otherwise some states limit application of rents col-
lected to taxes and maintenance.4"
9. The document should provide that the assignee shall not be ac-
countable for more monies than it actually receives from the mort-
gaged premises, nor shall it be liable for failure to collect rents.
10. The document should forbid any cancellation or modification
of leases and should also forbid any prepayment of rent except the
normal prepayment of monthly rent on the first of the month.
11. Authority should be given the assignee to sign the name of the
mortgagor on all papers and documents in connection with the op-
eration and management of the premises.
12. The assignment should provide that any assignee of the assign-
ment shall have all the powers of the original assignee.
13. It should contain a recital that:
(A). All rents due to date have been collected and that no
concessions have been granted.
(B). No rents have been collected in advance.
14. It should provide that the assignee may execute new leases, in-
cluding leases that extend beyond the redemption period.
Of course, neither an assignment of rents nor any other device can
make a good lease out of a bad one.
Example: A shopping center lease to a department store provides
that if five per cent or more of the parking lot is condemned, the ten-
ant may terminate the lease. This is a key lease, providing revenue
for retirement of the mortgage. It must be amended because if five
per cent or more of the parking lot is condemned (for example, for a
street widening) and the tenant terminates the lease, the mortgage
will go into default.
If the lease provides for a security deposit by the tenant with the
landlord, an assignment of leases and rents standing alone, gives the
mortgagee no right to the security deposit.4" Specific language should
be included in the assignment transferring all rights in the security
deposit.
4 7 Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Muffhin, 162 Wash. 33, 297 Pac. 743 (1931).
48 Anuzis v. Gotowtt, 248 111. App. 536 (1928); Keusch v. Morrison, 240 App. Div. 112,
269 N.Y.S. 169 (1934); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant S 473 (1947).
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If the mortgagee receives an assignment of the security deposit and
the securities or money are handed over to the mortgagee:
(A). In New York and some other states the mortgagee must not
commingle the security deposit with his own money. It is a
trust fund. Commingling will instantly make the mortgagee
liable to the tenant for wrongful misappropriation of the
fund.49 In other states commingling is allowed.
(B). In New York and some other states, the mortgagor-landlord
does not relieve himself of liability for the securities by de-
positing them with the mortgagee. He cannot in this fashion
rid himself of the trust. The mortgagor should therefore in-
sist on the tenant's consent to such transfer.
STATUTORY REDEMPTION
Any discussion of the mortgagee's right to possession and rents
would be incomplete without mention of the statutory right of re-
demption. When a mortgage foreclosure sale is held, the equitable
right of redemption ends. Indeed, the whole object of the foreclosure
suit is to put an end to the mortgagor's equitable right of redemp-
tion. In the last hundred years, however, laws have been enacted giv-
ing the mortgagor an additional concession. Under these laws, the
mortgagor is given one last chance to get his property back. Suppose,
for example, that a farmer whose farm is mortgaged has a bad crop
year. He cannot meet his mortgage payments and the mortgage is
foreclosed. Perhaps next year crops will be good, and he will have
enough to pay all of his debts. To afford farmers and other mortga-
gors one last opportunity to salvage their properties, legislatures have
passed laws allowing additional time, often one year, after the fore-
closure sale, during which the mortgagor can, by paying the amount
of the foreclosure sale price, get his property back from the mort-
gagee. This right is called the statutory right of redemption. Thus,
the equitable right of redemption ends with the holding of the fore-
closure sale, and the statutory right of redemption begins at that time.
Laws providing for statutory redemption have not been passed in
all states. California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Penn-
49 Mallory Associates Inc. v. Barving Realty Co., 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E. 2d 468 (1949);
2300 Concourse Realty Corp. v. Klug, ill N.Y.S. 2d 168 (1952).
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sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
and West Virginia apparently do not have redemption laws. Laws in
Florida, Indiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin provide for a
postponement of the foreclosure sale, which is not a true redemption
law. Special and unusual laws exist in Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri
and New Jersey. ° In states that have true redemption laws, the re-
demption period follows the foreclosure sale. In states where redemp-
tion laws have been passed, a modification of foreclosure procedure
has resulted. For example, in states having redemption laws, the pur-
chaser at the foreclosure sale usually does not immediately receive a
deed to the property; instead he receives only a certificate stating that
he will be entitled to a deed if redemption is not made. The rules re-
garding the mortgagee's right to possession and rents during the statu-
tory redemption period differ from state to state.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
If there are any recorded restrictive covenants binding the prem-
ises, a mortgagee who takes possession whether by virtue of his mort-
gage, an assignment of rents, or through foreclosure of the mortgage
will naturally be enjoined from violating the restrictions, for in equity
all those who have notice of restrictions are bound by them."
COVENANT LIABILITY
Suppose a lease contains some covenant that places a heavy burden
on the landlord, such as a covenant on the part of the landlord to re-
build buildings on the leased premises in the event of their destruc-
tion by fire or other casualty. If the leased property is thereafter
mortgaged, and the mortgage is later foreclosed, subject, of course,
to the lease, and the lease survives the foreclosure, and after the mort-
gagee has become the owner of the property by foreclosure there is a
failure to rebuild, the mortgagee in all states would be liable. He has
taken over all the privileges and burdens of being a landlord. 2 Ques-
tions arise, however, as to the mortgagee's liability arising before fore-
closure has been completed. Unfortunately the cases on these ques-
tions are so meager that few conclusions can safely be drawn.
However, since conclusions must be drawn, the first conclusion
50 Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420, 450.
51 KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 387 (3rd ed. 1958).
52 51 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant S 368 (1947).
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one may draw is that mortgagees probably have little to fear from
this source. An intensive study of the law reveals virtually no litiga-
tion on this question. Inquiry among mortgagees reveals no loss ex-
perience. Perhaps this is due to the fact that mortgagees are pretty
careful about getting involved in situations where they might ulti-
mately, by foreclosure, be saddled with burdensome leases. Another
explanation may lie in the fact that leases being for the most part
drafted by landlords place few oppressive burdens on the landlord. As
between landlord and tenant, the greater bargaining power often lies
with the landlord, although shopping center leases, particularly chain-
store leases and department store leases, may provide an exception.
For the most part, also, mortgagees are careful to provide themselves
with insurance against loss in such cases.
COVENANT LIABILITY IN TITLE AND
INTERMEDIATE STATES
When we turn away from practical business aspects of the prob-
lem to technical legal aspects, we are again compelled to speculate
because of the dearth of authority on the problem. In the situation
where a mortgage follows a lease we found that in title and interme-
diate states the mortgagee can compel the tenant to pay rent to him
when default in the mortgage payments occurs because in title and
intermediate states there is, in this situation, this mysterious privity
of estate between the mortgagee and the lessee. Privity of estate car-
ries with it burdens as well as benefits. Whenever the mortgagee is
allowed to step into the landlord's shoes for the purpose of reaping
benefits as against the lessee he must also stand in the landlord's shoes
for the purpose of carrying some of the landlord's liabilities. It would
therefore appear to follow that in title and intermediate states, where
the lease antedates the mortgage, there is danger that the mortgagee
will be held liable to the tenant for breach of any lease covenants that
"run with the land." Much has been written to illuminate the prob-
lem of what covenants may be said to run with the land.5" For our
present purposes it is enough to say that some covenants run and
others do not. A covenant to rebuild a building would very likely run
with the land.
We can test out the validity of these conjectures by turning to the
53 Clark, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS THAT RUN WiTH THE LAND, passim
(2nd ed. 1947); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with
the Land at Law, 27 TExAs L. REv. 419 (1949).
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situation where a leasehold estate is mortgaged. In title and interme-
diate states a mortgage of the leasehold creates privity of estate. In
other words, a mortgagee of the leasehold in such states stands in the
tenant's shoes and has virtually all the benefits and burdens that at-
tach to the tenant's status. In some of these states (notably Maryland,
New Hampshire and Virginia), the courts have held flatly that be-
cause of this privity of estate the mortgagee of a leasehold is liable for
rent under the lease if the tenant fails to pay it.54 This tends to sup-
port the conjecture that in title and intermediate states the mortgagee
would be liable on our hypothetical covenant to rebuild. In some
states, however, and this includes some title, intermediate and lien
states the courts have refused to hold the mortgagee liable for rent
unless he takes possession of the property.55
It will thus be seen that strict legal reasoning cannot lead us to a
definite conclusion on the problem of covenant liability. All one can
say is that the possibility of liability is present in title and intermedi-
ate states where the lease antedates the mortgage.
Of course where the mortgage antedates the lease we have said that
the mortgagee cannot compel the tenant to remain in possession and
pay rent, since privity of estate is lacking. This lack of privity of es-
tate should insulate the mortgagee from covenant liability, prior to
completion of his mortgage foreclosure.
COVENANT LIABILITY IN LIEN STATES
In a lien jurisdiction, a mortgage is not regarded as transferring
any title whatever. One could speculate, in consequence, that where
a lease antedates a mortgage in a lien state, the mortgage will not cre-
ate any privity of estate and therefore the mortgagee will have no lia-
bility on the landlord's covenants contained in the lease. This con-
clusion finds support in the rule, heretofore expressed, that in a lien
state, absent any valid assignment of rents or any valid provision in
the mortgage conferring on the mortgagee the right to possession or
rents, rents are not a part of the mortgage security. Rents belong to
the title holder and the mortgagee has no title. Since the mortgagee
enjoys no benefits under the lease it is arguable that he should not be
saddled with burdens. Unfortunately this solution, while logical, may
not be universally accepted by the courts. Turning to the analogy of
5473 A.L.R. 2d 1118, 1121 (1960).
55 73 A.L.R. 2d 1118, 1125 (1960).
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the mortgage on a leasehold, we find that in New York, a lien state,
if the mortgagee of a leasehold takes possession of the premises this
establishes privity of estate between the mortgagee and the landlord,
which results in the creation of liability on the part of the mortgagee
on those covenants that run with the land.56 The New York rule,
however, appears to be without merit and it is unlikely that it will
command much support elsewhere for the trend in lien and interme-
diate states is to hold the mortgagee of leasehold not liable for pay-
ment of rent or breach of the lease covenants until foreclosure of the
mortgage has been completed and the mortgage has acquired the
leasehold estate. 57 Of course, where the mortgage antedates the lease,
in lien states as in title states there is a total absence of privity of es-
tate; hence the mortgagee cannot be held liable on any covenants
running with the land prior to the competion of the foreclosure.
With the completion of the foreclosure, ownership of the land passes
to the mortgagee, assuming he is the successful bidder at the fore-
closure sale, and with this ownership liability on lease covenants will
attach, since privity of estate will then be present.
COVENANT LIABILITY UNDER AN ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
Suppose that in a title or intermediate state A leases to B. There-
after A mortgages to C and assigns the lease to C. When default oc-
curs under the mortgage, C chooses to collect rent not under the
mortgage but under the assignment. There is authority for the view
that such an assignment is not a transfer of the reversion, and C is en-
titled to rents without the creation of the privity of estate on which
liability depends.58 If this is true, it should follow that C would not
be liable to the tenant for breach of the lease covenants.59 It cannot
be stated flatly that this solution will command universal acceptance.
Courts might understandably be reluctant to allow C the benefits un-
56 Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. 603 (N.Y. 1830); 73 A.L.R. 2d 1118, 1129 (1960).
57 Feldman v. Urban Commercial Inc., 64 N.J. Super. 364, 165 A. 2d 854 (1960); Amco
Trust Inc. v. P. C. Naylor, 159 Tex. 146, 317 S.W. 2d 47 (1960); 73 A.L.R. 2d 1118, 1131
(1960); Indeed the law of covenants in general has had an unhappy history in New
York. 35 N.Y. U. L. REv. 1344, 1356 (1960).
58 Orman v. Burgess, 217 Ill. App. 311 (1920); Winnisimmet Trust Inc. v. Libby, 232
Mass. 491,122 N.E. 575 (1919); 55 L.R.A. (n.s.) 196 (1915); 51 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant
§§ 259, 260, 368 (1947).
59 S. H. Cohn Co. v. Simon, 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 371 (1916); McDougall v. Ridout,
9 V.C.Q.B. 239.
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der the lease without bearing the burdens.60 There appear to be few
court decisions on this point.
It is possible that the answer to this question may rest in part on the
form of the assignment. If the assignment purports to be an assign-
ment of the lease as well as an assignment of the rents, it is arguable
that an assignment in this form creates some sort of privity of estate
and liability would therefore ensue on covenants that run with the
land. Again, we need to remind ourselves that an assignment by the
lessor of the lease is an ambiguous document. A lessor who wishes to
transfer his title or reversion would use a deed. A lessor who wishes
to keep his title or reversion while conveying the right to receive rent,
would use an assignment of rents for that purpose. A conveyance of
the title or reversion would create privity of estate; an assignment of
rents would not. An assignment by the lessor of the lease and rents
thereunder falls somewhere between a conveyance of the title and an
assignment of the rents. It has been speculated as follows:
When the lessor has actually assigned his lease or his interest under the
lease, with no indication as to what was intended to pass, the most reason-
able rule is, and most courts have held, that unaccrued rents pass, together
with such covenants as are designed for the collection thereof, but all
covenants designed for the protection of the reversion, with the reversion
itself, remain in the assignor.61
For this reason, some mortgagees deliberately omit any assignment
of the lease in the assignment of rents form. They argue that, while
an assignment of the lease is automatically an assignment of rents ac-
cruing thereunder, an assignment of rents is not automatically an as-
signment of the lease and the covenants therein. As against this, one
must weigh the fact that it is the assignment of the lease to the mort-
gagee that appears significant to the courts in protecting the mort-
gagee against lease cancellations and advance payment of rents to the
mortgagor. The latter is an actual danger, as experience reveals. The
danger of covenant liability seems remote. Moreover, a lease is a con-
tract as well as a conveyance. The stipulations therein contained are
promises as well as covenants. The assignment of the benefits of a
contract does not present the technical problems, like those concern-
ing privity of estate, inherent in the law of covenants running with
the land. It is this reasoning that prompts a purchaser of land to de-
mand that the seller give him an assignment of existing leases. An as-
60 Cargill v. Thompson, 57 Minn. 534, 59 N.W. 638, 642 (dissenting opinion) (1894).
6155 L.R.A. (n.s.) 196 (1915).
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signment of the lease would carry the contract rights or choses in
action of the landlord even though privity of estate is wholly lack-
ing.62 It is doubtful that an assignment of rents would have this effect.
In lien states the danger of covenant liability, even where the mort-
gage is accompanied by an assignment of leases and rents, should al-
ways be less when in a title or intermediate state. There is less likeli-
hood that a court might find privity of estate to be present.
OCCUPIER LIABILITY
A mortgagee who proceeds to collect rents after the mortgagor's
default becomes personally liable for injuries caused by defects in the
premises:
1. If the acts of the mortgagee amount to a taking of possession.
2. And if an owner in possession would be liable under the same
circumstances.
Example: A tenant, or a member of his family, or a delivery boy,
or other person lawfully on the premises is injured on a common
stairway that has fallen into disrepair owing to the negligence of the
mortgagor or the mortgagee.
Example: The building, when the mortgagee assumes control, is
(or later becomes) dangerous to the public traveling along adjoining
sidewalks or streets, as where the building coal hole in the sidewalk
has a defective cover, and a pedestrian falls as a result and is injured. 3
This type of liability is such that even if the mortgagee leases the en-
tire building to a lessee in an effort to rid himself of the control of the
dangerous structure, the mortgagee's liability will nevertheless con-
tinue thereafter. One who "leases a nuisance" to a tenant is liable for
subsequent injuries.
Example: The mortgagee, or his building manager, or his other
62 Occasionally one hears it said that a deed of leased property gives the grantee all
the contractual rights ("privity of contract") the lessor enjoyed as against the grantee.
55 L.R.A. (n.s.) 190, 211 (1915). This is supposed to be by virtue of an Act of Parlia-
ment passed during the reign of Henry VIII ibid. This is open to question. It is more
likely that this venerable law was addressed to King Henry's special problems with con-
fiscated church lands, and did not concern itself with transfer of contractual rights.
2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 315 (1950); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT 833 (1910).
American laws patterned after this Act of Parliament present the same problem. Because
of this doubt a buyer of leased land will often insist that the seller give the buyer an
assignment of the seller's rights under the leases. If a buyer needs this protection, it is
obvious that a mortgagee has even greater need for the protection, for his rights are
never as comprehensive as those of a buyer.
63 Ferman v. Lombard Inv. Co., 56 Minn. 166, 57 N.W. 309 (1894).
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agents learn of a dangerous but not obvious condition in an apartment
and fail to warn an incoming tenant, who is injured as a result, as
where there is a defective floor in a dark closet.
Other illustrations of this "occupier liability" could be furnished.
It is obvious that these liabilities impose a continuing obligation to in-
spect. For example, even if a lease is made to a tenant at a time when
the premises are safe, an inspection must be made before a new lease is
made, even to the same tenant, for if the premises have become dan-
gerous in the meanwhile, the mortgagee-landlord will be liable on the
theory that he made a lease (the new lease) of defective premises for
a use that contemplated invitation of the public to the premises.
64
Suppose that the mortgagee merely collects rents, leaving actual
control of the building in the mortgagor. Here the mortgagee has no
occupier liability. *5 This situation is a rarity. As a rule, if a mortgagee
steps in, he wants to control the building, the new leases, mainte-
nance, insurance, and the like, and if he exercises such control the
mortgagee has occupier liability even though he purports to be acting
under an assignment of rents.66
RECENT ILLINOIS LEGISLATION CONCERNING MORTGAGEE'S
RIGHT TO POSSESSION
It is a matter of common knowledge, in Illinois, that a mortgagee
has the right to take possession of the mortgaged premises on default,
except as against a lessee under a lease senior in right to the mortgage.
However there has never been a completely practical remedy to en-
force this well-recognized right. To remedy this long-neglected over-
sight, House Bill 295 was enacted, effective August 7, 1961.
Procedurewise, the Act provides that upon the application by the
mortgagee and reasonable notice to the owners of the premises
(whether or not service of process has been effected) the court may
enter an order placing the mortgagee in possession, but if the prem-
ises are occupied by the owner or a contract purchaser as a residence
or homestead, such order cannot be entered until the owner has been
served with summons or by publication. If the right of the mortgagee
to take possession is controverted under oath, a hearing is conducted,
64 KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW 453 (3rd ed. 1958).
65 Luther P. Stephens Inv. Co. v. Berry Schools, 188 Ga. 132, 3 S.E. 2d 68 (1939).
66 Scott v. Hoboken Bank, 126 N.J.L. 294, 19 A. 2d 327 (1941); Zisman v. City of
Duquesne, 143 Pa. Super 263, 18 A. 2d 95 (1941); 41 C. J. Mortgages § 580 (1926).
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and if the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that
the plaintiff will prevail in the action, it may enter an order placing
the mortgagee in possession.
The original draft of this bill as it went into the Legislature used
the word "shall" throughout, conveying the notion that it would nor-
mally be mandatory upon the court to order the mortgagee placed in
possession. However, this language was changed in the final version
to provide that the court "may" enter the order in question, thereby
creating the inference that the court shall exercise a measure of dis-
cretion in this regard. This brings up the question whether the court
will in actual practice require proof of inadequacy of security, in-
solvency of the mortgagor, or the like, as is often required where
appointment of a receiver is applied for. Some significance must be
attributed to this change in language.
If the premises are occupied by the owner as a homestead, the court
may permit him to remain in occupancy notwithstanding the order
placing the mortgagee in possession. However, after foreclosure sale
the mortgagor must pay rent to the mortgagee if there is a deficiency.
It is a matter for conjecture whether mortgagors will point to this
language of the statute in seeking to be excused from paying rent
before a deficiency is revealed. It may be helpful to the mortgagee
here to be able to produce an assignment of leases and rents that spe-
cifically requires the mortgagor to pay rent at a specified rate imme-
diately on the occurrence of default.
In its order for possession the court may require the mortgagee to
give bond. This is an interesting twist. The prior law 67 permitted the
court, in lieu of appointing a receiver, to allow the mortgagor to stay
in possession on giving bond. Now it is the mortgagee who goes into
possession, giving bond where the court deems it proper. Interest-
ingly, the old law has not specifically been repealed.
The order placing or refusing to place a mortgagee in possession is
appealable.
Once an order has been entered placing a mortgagee in possession,
the mortgagee has all the rights of a mortgagee in possession, which
rights are pretty well defined in the old case law, and also all the
power and authority conferred upon him by the terms of the mort-
gage or other written instrument.
Under the old law it was pretty well settled that once a foreclosure
67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22 § 55 (1959).
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sale took place the mortgage was extinguished by merger and any
right of possession thereby conferred came to an end.68 This rather
technical holding was actually based on the philosophy that the re-
demption laws were intended to give the mortgagor-farmer another
year in possession, to raise crops, and pay off the sale. If the sale re-
sulted in a deficiency, the court might appoint a receiver, but the
mortgagee, as such, had no right to possession. This is changed under
the new law, which provides that the mortgagee may remain in pos-
session during the redemption period.
The act is broad in its definition of the mortgagee who may be
placed in possession by court order, including in its scope the holder
of a note secured by a trust deed, and an agent holding an assignment
of rents. This dispenses with the old notion that only the mortgagee
having a mortgagee's security title has the right to possession on de-
fault.
Under this new law, it should be much easier for the mortgagee,
armed with the court order, to induce tenants to pay rent to him. An
assignment of rents unsupported by a court order lacks the persuasive
force of a court order.
The new law also offers the advantage of the saving of expense
incident to a receivership.
Nothing in the law purports to characterize the remedy thereby
created as exclusive. Presumably all the old remedies remain. If the
court should refuse to place the mortgagee in possession, presumably
he might resort to ejectment or perhaps even forcible entry and de-
tainer.69
68 Schaeppi v. Batholomae, 217 Il. 105, 75 N.E. 447 (1905).
69 West Side Trust & Sav. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 111. 631, 193 N.E. 462 (1934).
